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This paper assesses the sophistication of pension funds’ investment policies using 
data on 748 Dutch pension funds during the 1999–2006 period. We develop three 
indicators of sophistication: gross rounding of investment choices, investments in 
alternative sophisticated asset classes and ‘home bias’. We find that pension funds’ 
strategic portfolio choices are often based on coarse and possibly less sophisticated 
approaches. Most pension funds, particularly the medium-sized and smaller ones, 
round strategic asset allocations to the nearest multiple of 5%, similar to age 
heaping in demographic and historical studies. Second, many pension funds invest 
little or nothing in alternative asset classes besides equities and bonds, resulting in 
limited asset diversification. Third, medium-sized and smaller pension funds favor 
regional investments and as such not fully employ the opportunities of international 
diversification. Finally, we show that pension funds using less sophisticated asset 
allocation rules tend to opt for investment strategies with a lower risk-return profile. 
 
Keywords: Pension funds, investment policy, portfolio choice, gross rounding, 
heaping, diversification, home bias, alternative investments, behavioral finance. 
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1  Introduction 
In the current financial crisis pension funds have sustained huge losses on the market value of their 
assets. The crisis has shown that pension funds are heavily exposed to fluctuations in asset prices, 
thereby illustrating the importance of pension fund investment policies. The crash in equity prices, 
coupled with a decline of the long-term interest rate used to discount liabilities, has slashed the 
funding ratio of Dutch pension funds, with only minor relief from higher bond prices. In 2008 alone 
the drop in market value was over 17% of total pension assets in the Netherlands. These losses have 
large consequences since the assets of Dutch pension funds exceed annual GDP. Most pension 
funds now face significant funding gaps and are forced to increase premiums, cut wage and price 
indexation and, if the funding ratio does not recover in time, they may have to cut pension rights. 
Evidently, the investment losses have profound implications and have raised questions as to the 
quality and sophistication of pension fund investment policies. 
 
A major contribution in the finance literature on optimal asset allocation is the two-fund separation 
theorem, which prescribes investors to hold an optimal portfolio of risky assets in combination with 
the risk-free asset (Tobin, 1958). This optimal portfolio should be mean-variance efficient, implying 
that for a given expected return, no additional diversification can lower the portfolio's risk 
(Markowitz, 1952). These theorems are building blocks of CAPM, which states that there is only 
one optimally risky portfolio, that is, the market portfolio (Sharpe, 1964). If this is the correct 
model, asset allocations for investors with different risk appetites should be simply different linear 
combinations of the riskless asset and the market portfolio. This implies that investors, including 
pension funds, should keep the ratio of bonds to stocks and other asset classes unchanged across all 
portfolios and vary allocations to the risk free asset, reflecting varying risk appetites. The finding 
that investors hold different proportions of risky assets – including the ratio of bonds to stocks – 
conflicts with the two-fund separation theorem and is called the Asset Allocation Puzzle (see also 
Canner et al., 1997). For pension funds the risk free portfolio would exactly replicate the pension 
liabilities and be made up of long-term inflation-linked bonds and common bonds. In practise, 
however, this portfolio is difficult to construct due to limited liquidity. 
 
Whereas in many countries, pension funds play a central role in providing old age benefits, the 
economic literature has so far paid little attention to how well pension funds perform this task in 
reality. The asset allocation strategy of a pension fund is the main driver of the risks and returns of 
its pension plans. Asset allocation involves two decisions. First, the level of risk appetite must be 
determined in line with the preferences of pension scheme participants and sponsor companies.  
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Second, the allocation of investments to different asset classes should be chosen in such a way that 
expected returns are maximized, given the pension fund’s liabilities and its risk appetite. A well-
developed asset allocation policy is critical to achieving this second task.  
 
Most countries impose few regulatory constraints on the investments of pension funds, which thus 
enjoy considerable freedom in allocating their assets. The risk-return assumptions for the different 
asset classes and the joint utility function of participants and sponsors determine the optimal 
combination of asset classes. The optimal investment policies may follow from Monte Carlo 
simulations of asset-liability management (ALM) studies, given preferences (such as the risk-return 
trade off) and market return and volatility assumptions. This paper does not evaluate how well 
pension funds allocate their wealth to various asset classes (see e.g. Campbell and Viceira, 2002). 
Rather, we assess the level of sophistication of the pension funds’ investment policies. We also 
examine how risk taking correlates with asset allocation policy.  
 
This study investigates the investment policies of 748 Dutch pension funds during the 1999–2006 
period. At the end of 2007, total pension fund assets in the Netherlands amounted to some € 719 
billion.
1 As percentage of GDP at 127%, the Dutch pension system ranks among the largest in the 
world. We find that the asset allocation policies of many funds appear to be relatively simple and 
that they vary widely, which raises the question whether all these policies can be optimal, given 
pension fund specific conditions and preferences. We develop three measures of being (less) 
sophisticated. The first yardstick assumes that less sophisticated pension funds are less 
knowledgeable about their (unknown) optimal asset allocation, or use more human judgment, and 
are therefore more likely to choose plausible numbers. They do not use detailed calculations, but 
have a systematic tendency to prefer ‘attractive’ numbers, for example by rounding of allocation 
shares to the nearest 5%. This phenomenon is sometimes called heaping and is well-known in 
sociological and historical studies. Most pension funds, particularly the smaller ones, but many 
large funds as well, apply such a coarse approach in allocating wealth to asset classes. Our second 
measure investigates how much has been invested in more complicated alternative asset classes 
besides equities and bonds, thereby improving asset diversification. We find that smaller and less 
sophisticated pension funds tend to diversify less. Third, we study ‘home bias’ and find that many 
funds favor regional investments, thereby limiting international diversification. These findings 
indicate that the investment policies of most pension funds are likely less sophisticated. Though it 
                                                    
1 For 2008, first estimates for total assets are € 606 billion, being 102% of GDP.  
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may be smart for a less sophisticated pension fund to avoid investments in more complicated 
alternative asset classes and in less-known countries. 
 
We also find that less sophisticated pension funds invest less in risky assets and more in bonds. The 
lower risk appetite of small funds may point to an awareness of the limited sophistication of their 
risk management. Low risk appetite might then be a fourth indicator of limited sophistication. 
Conversely, large funds may suffer from overconfidence because they put too much trust in (self-
developed) theories and models. At least over the last few years, and probably over the last decade, 
investments in risky asset classes, such as equity and real estate, have been less rewarding than 
investment in bonds. For both theoretical and practical reasons, this paper does not consider risk 
appetite or returns on investment as indicators of sophistication. All in all, the results suggest that 
there is scope for improvement in the investment strategies of especially the smaller and medium-
sized pension funds. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature on behavioral biases and imperfect 
asset allocation, while Section 3 describes the dataset used. Section 4 develops three measures of 
sophistication in pension funds’ investment behavior, and examines their mutual connection and 
their relationship to the size of pension funds. Section 5 estimates a possible relationship between 
the measures of investment sophistication and risk taking. The last section concludes. 
 
2  Behavioral biases and imperfect asset allocation 
Private investors often use simple rules of thumb in allocating their wealth across asset classes, 
resulting in suboptimal investment portfolios. The behavioral finance literature classifies such 
suboptimal investment decisions as behavioral biases or cognitive errors. Individuals use heuristics, 
or rules of thumb, because they have limited attention, memory, education, and processing 
capabilities. A number of papers have shown that individual investors often rely on simple 
allocation rules. Findings in the behavioral finance literature include in fact that asset allocations 
tend to be either zero or 100 percent in equities (Agnew et al., 2003) and that investors use the 1/n 
rule to allocate their money among the n funds they invest in (Huberman and Jiang, 2006). Benartzi 
and Thaler (2001) show that some investors use the 1/n rule to allocate investments equally among 
funds offered in pension plans and, consequently, that the equity allocation of investors is 
influenced by the proportion of stock funds offered. The natural conclusion is that the use of 




The tendency to round figures coarsely or to choose attractive numbers is also documented in a 
number of demographic and historical studies. For instance, self-reported age data in countries or 
time periods with low average levels of education often show high frequencies at attractive, ‘round’ 
numbers. This phenomenon is called age heaping. Individuals with limited knowledge about their 
age are found to have a higher propensity to choose a ‘plausible’ number. These individuals do not 
choose random numbers, but instead have a systematic tendency to choose attractive numbers, 
particularly those ending in 5 or 0. This phenomenon is reported for a number of data sources, 
including census returns, tombstones, and tax data. Demographic studies have shown that age 
heaping is correlated to education (e.g. Bachi 1951), income (e.g. Myers, 1976), illiteracy (Budd 
and Guinnane, 1991) and, more generally, human capital (Baten, Crayen and Hearn, 2006).  
 
While there is a growing literature documenting behavioral biases of private investors, much less is 
known about professional parties. Institutional investors are generally considered to be more 
sophisticated than private investors and are therefore assumed to invest more optimally. A number 
of theoretical papers argue that more sophisticated investors suffer less from cognitive biases or 
irrational behavior (e.g. Banerjee, 1992, DeLong et al., 1990, Hirshleifer et al., 1994, and Shleifer 
and Summers, 1990). However, there is little empirical evidence documenting (i) the investment 
behavior of institutional investors, or (ii) how this behavior is influenced by their level of 
sophistication. 
 
To fill this gap in the literature, this paper studies the investment behavior of institutional investors 
possessing varying degrees of sophistication. Scale advantages should enable large investment 
funds to hire competent experts and consultants and spend significant time and resources on 
optimizing their investment policies. Hence, we hypothesize that large funds are more sophisticated 
investors able to select optimal investment policies. Consequently, large funds should have a lower 
propensity to use heuristics in determining their asset allocation, but instead should use more 
advanced rules to guide investment policy. Investors at higher levels of sophistication are also 
expected to be more knowledgeable about alternative asset classes and consequently to invest 
relatively more in them. These factors should enable institutional investment funds to apply better 
asset class allocation strategies than small funds. Ultimately, higher levels of sophistication should 
also lead to better asset-liability management policies, but testing this latter hypothesis is outside 




Similar to the behavioral finance literature on individual investors, we find that institutional 
investors are also susceptible to behavioral biases. At the same time, however, we find that the 
investment behavior of institutional investors is influenced by their level of sophistication. In 
particular, we show that smaller institutional investors more often use heuristics for their investment 
strategy, diversify their investments less and take less risk. 
 
There are at least two reasons why the pension sector in the Netherlands provides an ideal setting to 
study the impact of investor sophistication on investment behavior. First, total assets under 
administration, our measure of the size of pension funds which may be an indicator of 
sophistication, varies widely. Pension funds ranges in size from small institutions – with assets of 
less than 100 million euros (28% of institutions) – to very large institutions with assets of more than 
one hundred billion euros. The variation in terms of participants is also wide, from less than 100 
participants (5% of institutions) to more than a million participants. Large institutions include 
industry-wide pension funds such as ABP and PFZW, which are among the biggest pension funds 
in the world. Small institutions are mostly company funds that provide pensions for the employees 
of a single company. Second, the Nederlandsche Bank collects comprehensive data on the 
investment policies of these institutions, which allows us to study their asset allocation decisions. 
 
3.  Data 
We use a detailed dataset with quarterly figures on 748 Dutch pension funds for 1999:I – 2006:IV, 
representing around 90% of total investments by pension funds in the Netherlands. Our sample 
includes 631 company pension funds, 95 industry-wide pension funds, and 10 professional group 
pension funds.
2 The data is from the Nederlandsche Bank, responsible for the prudential supervision 
of pension funds and their regulatory compliance. For each pension fund data is available on its 
strategic asset allocation, asset sales and purchases and on the market value of its investments in 
various asset classes. Pension funds generally do not fully and continuously rebalance their actual 
asset allocation to their strategic allocation policies (see Bikker, Broeders and De Dreu, 2009). As a 
result actual asset allocations reflect both active policy decisions of pension funds as well as 
(recent) asset returns on the portfolio holdings. We investigate strategic asset allocations, since 
these alone reflect active choices of pension funds. 
                                                    
2 Company funds provide pension plans to the employees of their sponsor company. They are separate legal 
entities, but are run jointly by the sponsor company and employee representatives. Industry funds provide 
pension plans for employees working in an industry. Such pension plans are based on a collective labor 




The sample is an unbalanced panel, as not all pension funds are included throughout the sample 
period, due to new entrants, mergers, terminations, and reporting failures.
3 Pension funds with less 
than two years of data and observations with evident reporting errors have been excluded, resulting 
in 748 selected pension funds. Table 1 presents summary statistics. The size of pension funds in the 
sample ranges from small pension funds with total investments worth less than € 1 million, to large 
pension funds such as ABP, the public servants pension fund, with total investments of over € 200 
billion. The average and median sizes of pension fund assets equal, respectively, € 799 million and 
€ 53 million. To compare pension funds with different levels of sophistication we have defined 
three size classes: small (investments of € 0 – 100 million), medium (€ 100 – 1000 million) and large 
(> € 1 billion). Although large in number (70% of the institutions), small pension funds administer 
only 2% of total pension fund investments. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for various pension fund sizes (1999:1 – 2006:IV) 
  Small funds  Medium-sized funds Large funds  All funds 
Average number of participants  1,977 15,747 236,040 26,523
Average investments (million euros)  29 320 8,276 799
Total number of participants (million euros)  0.6 2.3 10.1 13.1
Total investments (billion euros)  10.5 53.1 396.9 459.4
Number of pension funds  524 177 47 748
 
4.  Sophistication and investment policy 
In order to assess the sophistication regarding pension funds’ investment policies, this section 
develops three measures of sophistication, based on the data discussed above: (i) the use of gross 
rounding, (ii) investments in other simple or sophisticated asset classes, and (iii) home bias.  
 
4.1.  Gross rounding of asset allocations 
We first examine the asset allocation strategies or the investment policies of pension funds. The 
histograms in figure 1 show the strategic equity and bond allocations of Dutch pension funds.
4 Two 
patterns are striking. First, most remarkably, the strategic allocations cluster around numbers that 
are multiples of 5%. Table 2 shows that the frequencies of 5% multiples used for strategic equity 
                                                                                                                                                              
Finally, professional group funds offer pension schemes to groups such as general practitioners and public 
notaries. 
3 We also compared the results for a balanced sample comprising 381 pension funds that reported at least 
seven years of data. The results are similar to the tables that are presented, suggesting that the survivorship 
bias is not a significant issue.  
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and bond allocations far outstrip those of other numbers. Apparently, pension funds have a strong 
preference to round their strategic equity and bond allocations to the nearest 5%. The figures further 
suggest that coarse rounding to the nearest 10% is more frequent than rounding to 5%. Apparently, 
sets of ten are even more attractive than sets of five. Just as has been observed for private investors, 
we also notice that some pension funds take extreme positions of 0% and 100% in equities or 
bonds. Second, the dispersion of strategic equity and bond allocation across pension funds is large.
5 
The figures show little or no convergence around a certain strategic asset allocation indicating that 
(beliefs about) optimal asset allocation levels vary widely across pension funds, perhaps (partly) 
due to diverging conditions such as risk aversion and ageing. It is hard to belief that unknown 
preferences, such as risk aversion, would be able to explain the widely varying strategic assets 
allocations.  
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‘Attractive numbers’ for rounding should be simple to remember and easy to use for calculations. 
Multiples of 10%, 5% and also 2% exhibit those properties. The preference of pension funds to use 
‘attractive’ numbers for their strategic asset allocation may be due to the absence of compelling 
arguments for more ‘precise’ figures on the allocation of wealth across asset classes. Table 2 shows 
the percentages of pension funds that use these attractive numbers for their strategic equity and 
bond allocation. Pension funds that use multiples of 10%, 5% or 2% for their strategic equity 
allocation as well as their strategic bond allocation are classified as ‘using attractive numbers’. As 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Here, we disregard other asset categories, which represent relative small shares in total assets. For a number 
of (smaller) pension funds these shares are even zero, see Table 3. This is investigated further in Section 4.2. 
5 This is also clear from the histograms of actual equity and bond ratios, not shown here. These figures show 
smooth distributions (actual allocations are influenced by market movement and hence not rounded), but with 
the same wide dispersion.  
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already suggested by Figure 1, multiples of 5% (including tens) occur most frequently.
6 On average, 
60% of pension funds use multiples of 5% for their strategic equity and bond allocation, far above 
20%, the expected level in a uniform distribution of integers between 0% and 100%. In fact, 
pension funds can (and some do) report their asset allocations in decimals. We only consider 
integers to calculate the uniform distribution, while we only consider multiples of 10.0%, 5.0% 
and/or 2.0% to be attractive numbers. So in reality, the expected use of attractive numbers would be 
even lower than assumed here.  
 
Multiples of 10% are reported at slightly more than half the frequency for multiples of 5% 
indicating that on average pension funds slightly prefer even over odd numbers. The difference 
between multiples of 10% and multiples of 2% is only marginal indicating that percentages ending 
in 2, 4, 6 and 8 are little used. Table 2 shows also that small pension funds use attractive numbers 
significantly more frequently than medium-sized pension funds, while large pension funds use 
attractive numbers least frequently. 
 
Table 2: Attractive numbers used for strategic equity and bond allocation (in %) 
Attractive numbers 
Uniform 




funds   All funds  
Multiples of 10%  1  37  28  11  32 
Multiples of 5%  4  66  56  29  60 
Multiples of 2%  25  41  33  19  37 
Multiples of 2% or 5% 
a  36  72  63  41  67 
Explanation: Based on Chi-squared tests, all statistics are significantly larger (at virtually any significance level) than 
expected under a uniform distribution of integers between 0% and 100% (except the use of even numbers for large funds). 
Based on t-tests, the differences between attractive numbers used across different fund sizes are always significant at the 
1% level. The uniform distribution used for Chi-squared and t-tests are based on the assumption that pension funds round 
their asset allocation to integers.   
a Due to our definition of ‘using attractive numbers’ this row is by approximation equal to the sum of the two preceding 
rows minus the first row (which is the overlapping of the other two). Actually, this row is slightly higher because the 
respective definition is broader, e.g. covering allocation shares of 4% and 5%.  
 
Table 3 shows the combinations of equity and bond allocations for pension funds that round their 
strategic allocations for both asset classes to multiples of 5%. In line with Figure 1, the table 
confirms that there is a large variation of investment policies with little convergence to a certain 
average or median strategy. The most common strategic allocations are between 20% and 50% for 
equities and between 50% and 80% for bonds (see shaded cells).  
 
                                                    
6 Taking into account that in an interval from 0–100 multiples of 5% occur twice as often, multiples of 10% 
are used relatively more frequently than multiples of 5%, though the (relatively) difference is only small.  
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The hypothesized optimal asset allocation of pension funds depends on risk preferences of 
participants and sponsor(s), their assessment of risks and returns of the different asset classes, 
macro-economic variables, such as wage growth, inflation and real interest rates, their funding ratio 
and the age structure of participants. Typically, asset-liability management (ALM) studies take 
these factors into account. These studies could be used to obtain suppose optimal asset allocation 
numbers, using Monte Carlo simulations based on preferences (such as the risk-return trade off) and 
on market return and volatility assumptions. However, in practice, ALM studies are not used 
directly to determine optimal portfolio investments across asset classes. Rather, they provide input 
into a human appraisal process. The widespread use of multiples of 5% indicates that the 
determination of strategic asset allocations could be developed further for the majority of pension 
funds. 
 
Table 3: Frequency distribution of multiples of 5% used for strategic equity and bond  
               allocations (in % of observations) 
(%)  Bonds                                         
Equity   0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100  Sum 
0  1.2                    0.1          0.1  0.1    0.2  0.3  2.5  4.8 
5              0.1                        0.1  0.2    0.4 
10            0.1        0.1  0.1              0.3  0.7       1.5 
15                              0.1  0.1  0.9  1.0         2.1 
20                  0.2        0.1  0.4  0.6  0.8  7.2           9.4 
25          0.1          0.1      0.2  1.2  1.5  5.3             8.5 
30                  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.0  1.7  6.5               10.2 
35                0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.7  1.2  3.7                 6.5 
40              0.1  0.1  0.5  0.4  1.8  0.8  3.5                   7.1 
45      0.1            0.1  0.6  0.5  1.8                     3.1 
50  0.1        0.1  0.1      0.9  0.4  2.8                       4.4 
55               0.1  0.1    0.3                         0.6 
60            0.1  0.2  0.2  0.6                           1.1 
65            0.1  0.1                               0.2 
70              0.1                               0.1 
75                                             0.0 
80          0.2                                   0.2 
85                                             0.0 
90  0.1                                           0.1 
95                                             0.0 
100                                             0.0 
Sum  1.7  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.8  0.6  2.5  2.3  5.8  3.9  6.0  7.1  8.7  6.2  8.2  1.3  1.0  0.5  2.5  60.3 
Explanation: Cells in the upper triangular with values below 0.05 are shown as blanks. The blue shading indicates the 
most frequently chosen combinations. 
 
Table 4 presents the use of attractive strategic asset allocations by small, medium-sized and large 
pension funds over time. The statistics confirm that small funds are more likely than large funds to 
choose multiples of 5% for their investment strategies. On average, 66% of small pension funds  
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choose a multiple of 5% for their strategic equity and bond allocations compared to only 56% of 
medium sized funds and 29% of large funds. There is some variation over time: the use of multiples 
of 5% increases until 2002 (for large funds: 2003) and decreases afterwards. This may indicate that 
the use of ALM models in determining the strategic allocation has increased since 2002/2003. 
However, the finding that the use of multiples of 5% is inversely related to size is consistent over 
the years. Differences in the use of multiples of 5% between small, medium-sized and large pension 
funds are significant at the 1% level for each year. These findings indicate that small pension funds 
use less sophisticated rules for their strategic asset allocation more often than large funds. 
 








funds  All funds
1999  60 48 22 54
2000  64 51 25 57
2001  66 57 26 61
2002  70 64 29 65
2003  70 60 32 64
2004  70 61 30 64
2005  66 57 31 59
2006  65 52 32 56
Unweighed average  66 56 29 60
Explanation: For each year, the differences between frequencies for different fund sizes are significant at the 1% level 
(tested using t-tests). 
a Based on total investments, see Table 5. 
 
Many pension funds, particularly small ones, use specialist external consultants to advise on their 
investment strategies and asset liability management. Because the number of specialist consultants 
with expertise on pension fund investment strategies is limited, such consultants often advise 
multiple pension funds. The recommended investment strategies are tailored to the preferences of 
participants and sponsors and the structure of assets and liabilities. However, if external consultants 
turned out to have a preference for recommending grossly rounded numbers to serve their clients, 
they would thereby contribute to the prevalence of attractive numbers in the asset allocation of 




4.2.  Allocation across asset classes 
This section investigates how pension funds allocate investments across different asset classes. Our 
dataset distinguishes the following asset classes: equities, bonds, real estate, mortgages and loans, 
commodities, mixed mutual funds, money market instruments and other investments. More than 
50% of pension funds base their strategic asset allocation on bonds and equities only and do not 
consider alternative asset classes such as real estate or commodities. This suggests that these funds 
ignore other, generally more sophisticated, investment opportunities, thereby limiting their scope 
for higher expected returns and/or further risk diversification.  
 
Table 5 presents the allocation of pension funds’ wealth across asset classes for funds of various 
size categories. It shows that larger pension funds allocate greater shares of their investments to 
equities and smaller shares to bonds, compared to smaller funds. Medium-sized funds take an 
intermediate position. Larger pension funds, seeking better diversification of risks, invest more in 
alternative assets than small and medium size funds. We split alternative investments into simple 
assets (money market funds and mixed mutual funds) and sophisticated assets (real estate, 
commodities and loans) Larger pension funds invest also significantly more in alternative 
sophisticated assets, and less in alternative simple assets, compared to small funds. This behavior is 
probably steered in part by supervisory regulations which require a more sophisticated risk 
management for institutions which invest in more risky alternative investments. 
 
Table 5: Average strategic asset allocation by size classes (2006:IV) 












Size classes pension funds
a  In %         
0-100  (small)  28 63  5 4 37
100-1,000  (medium sized)  35 58  1 6 332
>1,000  (large)  39 47  2 12 9,520
Use of ‘attractive numbers’ for asset allocation     
Funds that round to 5%  30 61  4 4 383
Funds that do not round to 5%  35 56  2 8 2,475
Explanation: All statistics are simple averages in percentages. Differences between small, medium-sized and large funds 
for all asset categories distinguished are significant at a significance level of 1%, except for simple alternative investments 
between medium-sized and large funds. 
a Based on total investments (million euro). 
b Simple alternative investments include money market funds and mutual 
funds. 
c Sophisticated alternative investments include real estate, commodities and loans.  
 
The lower panel of Table 5 reveals evidence that pension funds which round their strategic asset 
allocation to 5% multiples hold more bonds and simple alternative assets whereas funds that do not  
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round invest more in equity and sophisticated alternative assets. This reveals that the two measures 
of sophistication, heaping and alternative asset investments, are correlated.  
 
Table 6 gives further insight in the relationship between investments in sophisticated alternative 
assets and pension fund sizes. The table shows that the majority of small funds invest less than 10% 
of their assets in sophisticated assets, whereas only 31% of the large funds have less than 10% 
invested in ‘alternative assets’. Only 15% of small funds invest more than 10% in sophisticated 
assets whereas 69% of the large funds do so. The lower panel of this table shows that funds that 
round to 5% multiples invest significantly less in sophisticated alternative assets. The outcomes of 
Table 6 confirm the finding that large funds better diversify their investments and choose a higher 
risk-return profile. Furthermore, this attitude turns out to be inversely correlated with heaping.  
 
Table 6: Investments in sophisticated assets
a by size and sophistication of pension funds 
               (in % of all pension funds; 2006:IV) 
    Investments in sophisticated assets 
Size classes pension funds
b   0%  0 - 10%  10 - 20%  >20% 
0-100  (small)  56  29  10  5 
100-1,000  (medium sized)  40  32  22  6 
>1,000  (large)  9  22  57  12 
Use of ‘attractive numbers’ for asset allocation 
Funds that round to 5%  63  17  15  5 
Funds that do not round to 5%  21  45  27  7 
Explanation: All statistics are simple averages in %. 
a Sophisticated asset classes include real estate, commodities and 
loans. 
b Based on total investments (million euro).  
 
4.3.  Home bias 
This section investigates in what degree pension funds diversify their investments geographically. 
International diversification can provide significant benefits by reducing risk for a given level of 
expected returns. However, not all investors exploit these diversification benefits to the full, as 
evidenced by their limited ownership of foreign shares. This phenomenon has been documented 
using both macro-economic data (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991) and firm-specific data (e.g. Kang 
and Stulz, 1997), as well as investor-specific data (e.g. Karllson and Norden, 2007). The main 
explanations point to explicit and implicit barriers to international investments. Other explanations 
include the use of domestic assets to hedge against unexpected changes in inflation and cognitive 
biases. However, these explanations have not been able to fully account for the lack of 
international diversification by domestic and foreign investors. Therefore, this phenomenon is 
known as the home-bias puzzle.  
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Home bias usually refers to a preference by investors to hold domestic assets. Here we refer to more 
than proportional investment (of Dutch pension funds) in the euro area, as the data do not present 
greater detail. International diversification provides substantial risk-return benefits and hence home 
bias indicates a certain degree of shortsightedness that points to less sophistication. Table 7 shows 
that on average, large pension funds invest 30% of their assets within the euro area , while small 
pension funds’ investments in the euro zone average 56% of assets.
7 The home preference for assets 
from the euro area is at 48% much stronger in less sophisticated funds (which round to 5%) than in 
sophisticated ones (36%). This finding is consistent with a study by Karllson and Norden (2007), 
who report a higher likelihood of home-bias for less sophisticated investors with lower education 
levels and no previous experience with investments in risky assets. Remarkably though, the home 
bias is larger for sophisticated small and medium-sized funds compared to non-sophisticated funds 
of these size classes (which is unexpected), whereas it is much smaller for sophisticated large funds 
compared to non-sophisticated large funds, in line with ‘theory’.  
 
Table 7: Home bias of equity investments 
a (2006:IV) 
   Investments within the EMU (in%) 
Size classes pension funds 
b  All 
Funds that use 
multiples of 5% 
Funds that do not 
use multiples of 5% 
0–100  (small)  56  51  69 
100–1,000  (medium sized)  49  47  53 
>1,000  (large)  30  47  23 
All funds     43  48  36 
Explanation: All statistics are simple averages in %. 
a Including exposure from derivatives; 
b Based on total investments 
(million euro). 
 
We also observe home bias in all investments of pension funds with regard to the currency, where 
small and medium-sized funds hold around 85% of their assets in euros against 63% for large funds. 
This euro bias confirms the euro-area bias of Table 7. Incidentally, pension funds tend to hedge 
their currency risk with derivatives, reducing their net non-euro exposure to only 4% for small 
funds and 8% for large funds. Note that currency risk insurance does not wipe out the euro-area bias 
above, as the lack of international diversification remains. 
 
5.  Sophistication and risk taking 
This section investigates a possible relationship between the measures of investment sophistication 
and risk taking. We hypothesize that pension funds with less investment expertise are generally 
                                                    
7 The actual share of EMU assets in the world-wide total is just below 28% (IMF Global Financial Stability 
report, April 2009).  
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more risk-averse. Assuming that they are less knowledgeable about how to invest assets optimally, 
less sophisticated funds may deliberately choose a lower risk profile for their asset allocation. This 
strategy makes sense intuitively, as small funds may be less inclined to invest in risky assets since 
their limited sophistication and expertise makes them feel less comfortable with these risks. 
Conversely, large funds are more likely to have significant in-house expertise and use sophisticated 
modeling techniques, which may make them less averse to risk taking. Sophisticated funds may 
suffer from overconfidence because they put too much trust in the theories and models they have 
developed (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). We note that the recent credit crisis shows that risk taking is 
not always a rewarding strategy. In the last decade, less sophisticated small funds have typically 
obtained higher investment returns than larger more sophisticated pension funds. 
 
Figure 2 presents the average strategic equity and bond allocations over time for pension funds in 
different size categories. On average, large pension funds invest a greater share of their assets in 
equities and less in bonds, as also observed in Section 4.2. The graphs show that this latter effect is 
persistent over the entire sample period. Investing more in bonds, as small funds do, reduces the 
mismatch between the duration of assets and liabilities, and reduces the exposure to volatile equity 
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8 Hence, the figures indicate that small and less sophisticated funds choose a lower risk 
exposure. Figure 2 further shows that strategic asset allocations vary significantly over time, 
reflecting the dynamic nature of investment policies. The strategic asset allocation is most volatile 
for large pension funds. They update their investment policy more frequently. Besides, the average 
of large funds is based on a lower number of pension funds, see Table 1. 
 
To examine the relationship between measures of less sophistication and risk taking, we estimate 
the following equation: 
 
1 , 1 , , , , − − + + + + = t i t i t i t i t i Size HomeBias ation Diversific Heaping tion BondAlloca ε δ γ β α  
                                  t i i t i Governance eferences Risk , 1 , Pr η ϕ φ + + + −   (1) 
 
                                                    
8 Nominal defined benefit pension liabilities are best resembled by nominal government bonds. Instead, 
defined benefit pension liabilities that are fully indexed to prices are best resembled by inflation linked bonds. 
In many Dutch defined benefit pension deals, indexation is contingent on the funding ratio of the pension 
fund. The market value of this contingent indexation can be derived using option pricing theory. In this case it 
might be optimal to have considerable equity exposure, see e.g. Broeders (2006).  
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The dependent variable BondAllocationi,t is the strategic bond allocation of pension fund i (i = 
1,…,N) at quarter t (t = 1,…,T). The explanatory variables Heaping and Diversification are dummy 
variables indicating less sophisticated asset allocation. Heaping equals one if the strategic equity 
and bond allocation are multiples of 5% and zero otherwise. Diversification stands for sophisticated 
diversification and is defined as ‘the strategic allocation to alternative sophisticated assets’ minus 
‘the strategic investment in other simple assets’, both as a percentage of total assets. HomeBias is 
the percentage of investments in the EMU.A positive estimate for β and δ a negative estimate for γ 
would indicate that pension funds with less developed strategies choose a lower risk profile for their 
portfolio by investing a higher share of their wealth in bonds.  
 
The variable Size, measured as the log of total investments, is included to estimate the impact of 
scale on the risk profile of pension funds. This variable is included with a lag to avoid endogeneity 
problems, as positive returns on bond investments could automatically lead to an increase in both 
the strategic bond allocation and total investments during the same period (Bikker, Broeders and De 
Dreu., 2009). A negative estimate for  1 δ  would indicate that the investments of larger pension 
funds are riskier. Scale advantages should enable large pension funds to apply a better developed 
allocation policy and, therefore, this variable may also pick up some of the variation that not 
explained by the first two variables which are used as indicators for the sophistication of asset 
allocation (Heaping and Diversification).  
 
RiskPreferences is a vector of three variables that control for risk preferences of participants and 
sponsors. The variable ‘investments per participant’ is included to control for the impact of higher 
average pension investments on risk preferences. A negative coefficient would indicate that 
participants with higher pension fund investments are less risk averse. The age variable ‘percentage 
of pensioners’ is included to control for the duration of liabilities. A positive coefficient for this 
variable would indicate that pension funds with a short investment horizon choose a lower risk 
profile (see Bikker et al., 2009). The variable ‘funding ratio’, calculated as total investments 
divided by discounted pension liabilities, is included because, from a sound risk management point, 
a higher buffer provides room to invest more in risky assets.
9 This variable is included with a one-
quarter time lag to avoid endogeneity problems and since it may take some time before changes in 
the funding ratio affect a fund’s strategic bond allocation.  
                                                    
9 This is also according to the Dutch regulatory regime that requires that the probability of a funding ratio 
falling below 100% within one year must be less than 2.5%. Next to that, pension funds should always have a 




Governance is a vector of three dummy variables that control for differences in the governance of 
pension funds. The variable ‘Industry funds’ equals one if the pension fund provides pension plans 
for employees in an industry and zero otherwise, whereas the variable ‘Professional group funds’ 
equals one if the pension fund provides a pension scheme to a specific professional group (e.g. 
medical profession, public notaries) and zero otherwise. Finally, the variable ‘Defined contribution 
plan’ equals one if a defined contribution pension scheme is offered, instead of a defined benefit 
plan.  
 
Table 8: The strategic bond ratio and indicators of sophistication for various pension fund  
                types (1999:1 – 2006:IV) 
  All pension funds  Company pension funds  Industry pension funds 
Heaping (gross rounding)  0.032***  0.024***  0.074*** 
Diversification in alternative 
assets  -0.288***  -0.187***  -0.637*** 
Pension fund size (t–1)  -0.026***  -0.028***  -0.015*** 
Investments per participant (t-1)  -0.030***  -0.028***  -0.810*** 
Percentage pensioners  -0.048***  -0.061***  0.097*** 
Funding ratio (t-1)  -0.047***  -0.050***  -0.024*** 
Industry pension funds   -0.030***     
Professional group pension funds   0.057***     
Defined contribution plan  -0.057***  -0.050***  -0.024** 
Intercept  0.970***  -0.074***  -0.062*** 
Number of observations  13,517  11,143  2,119 
F-statistics   460  304  206 
R-squared, adjusted  0.24  0.16  0.45 
Notes: Two and three asterisks indicate levels of confidence of 95% and 99%, respectively. 
 
Table 8 reports estimation results for Equation (1) except the home-bias variable, both for all funds 
and for company and industry funds separately. Inclusion of ‘home bias’ would reduce the number 
of observations from 13,517 to 1,737.
10 All key variables enter with the expected signs and are 
significant at a 1% significance level in all three specifications (except the DC dummy for industry 
funds which is significant at a 5% confidence level). The results provide strong evidence that small 
pension funds with less optimal allocation policies are more likely to choose low risk asset 
allocation strategies. Specifically, the heaping variable enters with a significant positive sign, 
showing that pension funds with less advanced asset allocation policies invest more in bonds. The 
                                                    
10 We estimated also Equation (1) including ‘home bias’. This variable enters significantly and with the 
expected sign (more home bias implies higher investments in bonds). The other two measures of (the lack of) 
sophistication show up with the expected sign, when they are significant, that is, for diversification (all 
variants) and heaping (industry funds). The results are available upon request.but have not been not reported 
since the number of observations for ‘home bias’ is relatively low.   
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coefficient indicates that pension funds using multiples of 5% for their asset allocation invest, on 
average, 3.2 percentage points more in bonds (first column). The coefficient is even higher for 
Diversification, indicating that pension funds investing relatively more in alternative sophisticated 
assets and less in alternative simple assets, invest less in bonds. Finally, the size variable enters with 
a negative sign, indicating that large funds choose higher risk profiles by investing relatively less in 
bonds. An alternative size measure, that is, number of participants instead of total assets, leads to 
virtually identical estimation results.
11  
 
The two included risk preference variables carry their expected sign: a higher funding ratio and 
more investments per participant both imply a relatively lower allocation to bonds. A higher 
percentage of pensioners should result in a lower risk profile with relatively more bonds, but this is 
observed for industry funds only. In an alternative specification of model (1) we have used the 
equity ratio instead of the bond ratio as dependent variable (see Appendix). In this specification the 
percentage of pensioners consistently carries the expected sign, so that this effect appears to be 
sensitive to the precise choice of the dependent variable.
12 Compared to company funds, industry 
funds hold relatively less in bonds while the reverse is true for professional group funds. The latter 
is explained in Bikker et al. (2009). Defined contribution plans, which have no nominal pension 
benefit target, tend to hold lower investments in bonds. The goodness of fit (R
2) in Table 8 is rather 
low, indicating that many other determinants of the bond ratio are not captured by model (1). This 
indicates a large impact on the strategic allocation of preferences, risk aversion and human 
judgment. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper develops three measures of the sophistication of pension funds’ investment policy. Our 
results firstly show that most pension funds in the Netherlands select attractive numbers, 
particularly multiples of 5%, for their allocation of both equities and bonds. This supports the 
observation that in the current practice, asset allocations do not follow directly from optimization of 
ALM models. Rather, the strategic allocation is determined by human judgment, given results from 
ALM studies. Coarse rounding is more frequent in smaller and medium-sized funds, indicating that 
sophistication is related to pension fund size. This is confirmed by the finding that smaller funds 
also invest less in alternative investments, other than equity and bonds. They invest particularly less 
in more sophisticated or complex other asset classes. This type of limited diversification is our 
                                                    
11 The results are available upon request. 
12 The bond and equity ratios are not (exactly) each other complement, as also other assets exists.  
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second measure for (less) sophistication. Finally, smaller pension funds and medium-sized pension 
funds suffer more from home bias in their equity investment than larger pension funds. We find that 
these three measures are interrelated and correlated with pension fund size. These results suggest 
that the asset allocation policies of smaller funds are possibly less developed than they might be or, 
at the end, rely more on human judgment.  
 
A striking finding is the huge variation of asset allocation across pension funds. We find that a 
major part of this variation is explained by the size of pension funds. Small funds tend to choose 
investment strategies with a lower risk (and lower expected return) profile and invest little in more 
complex alternative asset classes. The lower risk appetite of small funds may, in part, balance their 
limited sophistication with respect to the believed optimal asset allocation. However, even when 
controlling for size pension funds make significantly diverging choices. Theoretically these 
variations in asset-allocation could be explained by differences in risk preferences, fund 
characteristics and investment horizons of plan participants. However, these determinants explain 
only a relatively small part of the differences in bond and equity allocation. This outcome reflects 
widely varying views on the optimal investment mix. It seems likely that different risk-return 
assumptions of the various asset classes, expertise of pension fund investment managers and 
personal preferences of pension boards also play an important role. The analysis of this latter 
phenomenon is outside the scope of this paper, but is suggested as an interesting topic for future 
research.  
 
The findings in this paper suggest that further consolidation of the Dutch pension sector, by mergers 
or further cooperation (e.g. in so called general pension institutions, which can provide pensions for 
companies or industries) may contribute to improved sophistication of the investment policy of 
pension funds. Such benefits of consolidation are in line with a previous study, in which we found 
that there is a negative correlation between the size of pension funds and administrative and 
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APPENDIX   THE EQUITY RATIO AND INDICATORS OF SOPHISTICATION 
 
Table 9 reports estimation results for an alternative of Equation (1), with the equity ratio instead of 
the bond ratio. All variables enter with a 1% significance level in all three specifications (except for 
sophisticated diversification in the company funds model). The results confirm that small pension 
funds with less developed allocation policies are less likely to choose more risky assets such as 
equity. Specifically, the heaping variable enters with a significant negative sign, showing that less 
advanced pension funds invest somewhat less in bonds. The coefficient indicates that pension funds 
that using multiples of 5% for their asset allocation invest, on average, 0.5 percentage points less in 
equity (first column). The coefficient is even higher for Diversification, indicating that pension 
funds that invest more in other sophisticated assets minus the strategic allocation in other simple 
assets (both as a percentage of total assets) invest more in equity. The total effect of the three 
measures of lack of sophistication is x percentage points. Finally, the size variable enters with a 
positive sign, indicating that large funds choose higher risk profiles by investing relatively more in 
equity. 
 
The three risk preference variables have their expected sign: a higher funding ratio and more 
investments per participant both imply relatively higher equity investments, whereas relatively high 
numbers of pensioners, that is ageing, result in a lower equity ratio. Industry funds and professional 
group funds have less equity than company funds. Defined contribution plans, which have no 
nominal pension benefit target, tend to have higher equity ratios.  
 
Table 9: The strategic equity ratio and indicators of sophistication for various pension  
                fund types (1999:1 – 2006:IV) 
  All pension funds  Company pension funds  Industry pension funds 
Heaping (gross rounding)  0.005***  0.008***  -0.017*** 
Diversification in alternative assets  0.041***  0.006  0.283*** 
Pension fund size (t–1)  0.027***  0.030***  0.009*** 
Investments per participant (t-1)  0.053***  0.052***  1.317*** 
Percentage pensioners  -0.073***  -0.067***  -0.198*** 
Funding ratio (t-1)  0.052***  0.061***  0.015*** 
Industry pension funds   -0.029***     
Professional group pension funds   -0.058***     
Defined contribution plan  0.026***  0.061***  0.015*** 
Intercept  -0.042***  0.029***  0.090*** 
Number of observations  13,517  11,143  2,119 
F-statistics   264  291  164 
R-squared  0.18  0.20  0.28 
Notes: Two and three asterisks indicate levels of confidence of 95% and 99%, respectively. 